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Abstract
When market structure is complete, factor demands by households
will be independent of their characteristics, and households will take their
production decisions as if they were pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms. This obser-
vation constitutes the basis for one of the most popular empirical tests for
complete markets, commonly known as the ￿separation￿hypothesis. In
this paper, we show that all existing tests for separation using panel data
are potentially biased towards rejecting the null-hypothesis of complete
markets, because of the failure to adequately control for unobservable in-
dividual e⁄ects. Since the variable on which the test for separation is based
cannot be identi￿ed in most panel datasets following the usual covariance
transformations, and is likely to be correlated with the individual e⁄ect,
neither the within nor the variance-components procedures are able to
solve the problem. We show that the Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimator,
in which the impact of covariates that are invariant along one dimension
of a panel can be identi￿ed through the use of covariance transformations
of other included variables that are orthogonal to the individual e⁄ects as
instruments, provides a simple solution. We furnish an empirical illustra-
tion using a rich Tunisian dataset in which separation -and thus the null of
complete markets- is strongly rejected using the standard approach, but is
not rejected once correlated unobservable individual e⁄ects are controlled
for using the Hausman-Taylor instrument set.
Keywords: panel data, individual e⁄ects, household models, testing
for incomplete markets, development microeconomics, Tunisia.
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1 Introduction
One of the most widely-used empirical tests for the presence of market imper-
fections in developing countries is provided by the so-called ￿separation￿ hy-
pothesis. Numerous papers, including the seminal article by Benjamin (1992),
1have tested the hypothesis that factor demands on a given plot of land will
be independent of household characteristics, when market structure is (almost)
complete (Singh, Squire and Strauss, 1986; see the summary of the recent lit-
erature, as well as two typical applications to African data, in Udry, 1996).1
Separation implies that the marginal productivity of inputs will be a function
solely of plot characteristics and prices, and that households take their produc-
tion decisions as if they were pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms. In contrast, when factor
demands are a function of household characteristics, marginal productivities are
not equated across plots and a deviation with respect to the ￿rst-best optimum
obtains. Moreover, the production and consumption decisions of households can
no longer be treated recursively.
The purpose of this note is to demonstrate that: (i) in most cases, the
standard test for separation using panel data is biased towards rejecting the
null-hypothesis of complete markets because of a problem of unobservable in-
dividual e⁄ects; (ii) the usual covariance transformations performed on panel
data cannot solve this problem; but (iii) the Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimator
can. In addition, we provide an empirical illustration using a Tunisian dataset
in which the rejection of the null-hypothesis of complete markets using the stan-
dard approach is overturned once correlated individual e⁄ects are controlled for
using the Hausman-Taylor estimator.
In the most common version of the test for separation, the typical equation
being estimated on plot-level agronomic data is given by:
Yiht = Xiht￿ + Zht￿ + "iht; (1)
where Yiht is total labor usage (i.e., family and hired labor) on plot i, cultivated
by household h, at time t, Xiht is a matrix of plot characteristics, Zht is a matrix
of household characteristics, and "iht is a disturbance term that satis￿es the
usual Gauss-Markov assumptions. Separation is then associated with a simple
F-test on the exclusion restriction that ￿ = 0. In the prototypical expression of
the test for separation (Benjamin, 1992), Zht is household size.
The main problem associated with this procedure is that the disturbance
term "iht can in all likelihood be decomposed into a nested error component
structure given by:2
"iht = ￿t + ￿h + ￿ht + ￿iht; (2)
where ￿t is a shock common to all plots and households at time t, ￿h is a
time-invariant household e⁄ect, ￿ht is a household-time e⁄ect, and ￿iht is a dis-
turbance term that satis￿es the usual assumptions.3 In most plot-level datasets
1A concise primer on household models is also provided by Bardhan and Udry (1999),
chapter 2. Note that Benjamin (1992) used Indonesian household-level data and was therefore
unable to control for individual e⁄ects at all.
2See Baltagi et al (2001).
3￿h will represent, for exemple, unobservable productivity characteristics of the household,
time-invariant whereas ￿ht might be given by a transitory unobserved household shock, such
2used in the literature, each household cultivates several plots. This is a standard
panel data framework, with one dimension being given by plots, the second by
households, and the third by time. Although ￿h can be accounted for by a
￿within￿procedure which transforms variables into deviations with respect to
their household-speci￿c means (over all time periods), there remains ￿ht. Since
it is probable that ￿ht is correlated with Zht, the least-squares estimate of ￿,
even after the standard ￿within￿ transformation, will be biased with, in the
scalar case:






e is the variance of the residual ^ eiht from the auxiliary ￿within￿regres-
sion of household size on Xiht.4 If cov[￿ht; ^ eiht] 6= 0, as is likely in the context of
what is essentially a labor demand equation, then all standard tests of separa-
tion are biased towards rejecting the null-hypothesis of complete markets, when
the ￿true￿value of ￿ is zero. One may therefore reject the null not because
market structure is necessarily incomplete, but simply because of a banal prob-
lem of unobservable heterogeneity. Another way of putting this is that, in the
standard test, the rejection of separation is conditional on the maintained iden-
tifying assumption that ￿ht is the same across all households at a given time t.
It is very likely that this assumption is violated.
The usual econometric response to a problem of unobservable individual
heterogeneity in panel data is to apply one of the standard covariance transfor-
mations, such as the ￿within￿procedure. Here, this would involve expressing all
variables as deviations with respect to their household-speci￿c means, at a given
t. While, under the assumption of exogeneity, this does allow one to recover
unbiased estimates of ￿, it has the regrettable side-e⁄ect of eliminating the vari-
able(s) upon which the test for separation is based since, when one sweeps out
￿ht, one also sweeps out Zht. Since it is highly likely that ￿ht is not orthogonal
to Zht, random e⁄ects are not an answer, as they too will yield biased estimates
of ￿.
Moreover, standard instrumental variables procedures, in which one would
simply instrument for Zht, are not usually implementable. This is because
admissible exogenous instruments that would be correlated with Zht but are
orthogonal to ￿ht are usually not available or, if they are, should probably
already be included in Zht for theoretical reasons.
The problem, which is similar in spirit to that of consistently estimating the
returns to education using panel data when schooling is correlated with the indi-
vidual e⁄ects, can be solved using the Hausman-Taylor (1981, henceforth, HT)
as a wedding that a⁄ects simultaneously the household composition and the human capital of
the household. Note that in datasets where it is possible to follow plots over time, there may
also be a time-invariant plot-speci￿c e⁄ect.
4Hsiao (1986), p. 64, equation (3.9.3). The corresponding matrix expression obtains when
Zht involves several household characteristics.
3instrumental variables estimator, which allows one to control for unobservable
individual e⁄ects that are correlated with Zht, while allowing one to identify ￿.
2 An empirical illustration of the unwarranted
rejection of the null-hypothesis of complete
markets
2.1 The Hausman-Taylor instrument set
Let X1iht be those elements of Xiht that are uncorrelated with ￿ht, while X2iht
are those that are; Z1ht and Z2ht are de￿ned in a similar manner. The set of
instruments proposed by HT (1981), adapted to the three-dimensional panel
structure, is:
AHT = [QvtXiht;PvtX1iht;Z1ht]; (4)
where Pvt and Qvt are the idempotent matrices that perform the ￿between￿and
￿within￿transformations at time t, respectively.5 Under the assumption that
Xiht is uncorrelated with ￿iht, QvtXiht is a legitimate set of instruments since
E[(QvtXiht)
0￿iht] = 0. The basic intuition behind the HT estimator is that
only the ￿ht component of the error term is correlated with [X2iht Z2ht], which
allows one to use QvtX2iht as instruments for X2iht, while PvtX1iht furnishes
the instruments for Z2ht. The HT estimator therefore allows one to control
for unobservable correlated individual e⁄ects, while allowing one to identify the
parameters of interest (￿) in the context of testing for separation. A necessary
condition for identi￿cation is that the number of elements of X1iht be greater
than the number of elements of Z2ht (HT, 1981, Proposition 3:2, p. 1385).6
The three-dimensional nature of our dataset allows us an additional de-
gree of freedom in terms of the de￿nition of HT-type instruments. Above, we
considered orthogonality conditions of subsets of Xiht and Zht with respect to
the individual-time e⁄ect ￿ht: But the three-dimensional nature of the data
also allows us to construct instruments based on orthogonality conditions with
respect to variables that have been purged of their time-invariant household-
speci￿c component which is correlated with ￿h. An advantage of this procedure
is that, in empirical applications, the orthogonality of PvtX1iht with respect
to the individual e⁄ects could be suspect. Purging PvtX1iht of its component
5For simplicity of exposition, we express the instrument set as if the data were balanced.
In the empirical application, the unbalanced nature of the data will, of course, be taken into
account.
6These results have been extended by Amemiya and MaCurdy (1986) and Breusch, Mizon
and Schmidt (1989) who suggest a broader set of instruments that should improve e¢ ciency.
Their approach, however, is only possible on balanced data, which is not the case in the dataset
used in this paper or, for that matter, in most plot-level agronomic datasets. Notice that the
HT instrument set is admissible only if exogeneity is satis￿ed. This is another potential source
of bias in tests for separation, but which is di¢ cult to address because of the lack of admissible
plot-level instruments in most datasets.
4that is correlated with the time-invariant individual e⁄ect, ￿h; should render it
more palatable as a potential instrument set. In that case, the set of HT-type






e X1iht = Qv(PvtX1iht) (6)
denotes the matrix of explanatory variables that have been purged of their
component which is correlated with ￿h. In other words, Qv = I ￿ Pv is the
idempotent projection matrix that transforms variables into deviations with
respect to their household-speci￿c means (over all time periods).7
2.2 An empirical illustration
In order to illustrate our fundamental point concerning the bias a⁄ecting conven-
tional tests for separation in household models, consider the following standard
procedure implemented on a typical plot-level dataset. The data come from
two surveys (1993, 1995) carried out in the village of El Oulja, Tunisia (see
Matoussi and Nugent, 1989, and La⁄ont and Matoussi, 1996, for descriptions of
the village). These data display those properties discussed in the introduction:
a Hausman test of random household-time e⁄ects (￿ht) versus ￿xed e⁄ects in an
empirical counterpart to equations (1) and (2) strongly rejects (with a p-value
below 0:001) the null of the absence of correlation between ￿ht and Zht. The
bias identi￿ed in equation (3) is therefore manifestly present in conventional
tests of the null-hypothesis of complete markets using this panel dataset.
For the purpose of HT estimation, we divide the explanatory variables into
two categories: (i) X1iht variables, assumed to be uncorrelated with ￿ht, include
four soil type dummies and a dummy variable that indicates whether the plot
is irrigated or not, as well as a set of eight crop dummies;8 (ii) X2iht variables,
assumed to be correlated with ￿ht, are given by the share of costs borne by the
cultivator, divided by the share of output received, for eight di⁄erent inputs, as
well as log plot size in hectares.9
The economic rationale for allowing the variables included in X2iht to be
correlated with ￿ht is that they may, in the context of tenancy contracts (which
account for 28 percent of the plots in the sample), be determined as the solution
to a principal-agent relationship between a landlord and a tenant, and would
7Note that the three-dimensional nature of our dataset allows us to use some other com-
binations of our exogeneous explanatory variables. They are not considered here.
8The soil types are clay, red, sandy and barren, with mixed soil types being the excluded
category; the crop dummies are other cereals, potatoes, onions, garden vegetables, tomatoes,
beetroots, melon and fodder; the excluded category is wheat. We also include a year dummy.
9The output and cost shares both equal 1 on plots cultivated by owner-operators. Values
strictly less than or greater than one of the ratio obtain on plots under share tenancy contracts.
5then be functions of tenant characteristics, including those unobservable charac-
teristics potentially captured by ￿ht.10 Plot size is also assumed to be correlated
with ￿ht, as it too may be chosen by landlords for plots under tenancy contracts.
Both of these hypotheses will be subjected to a test of the corresponding overi-
dentifying restrictions below. Our single Z2ht variable is given by log household
size. In line with the usual methodology, the dependent variable is log total
(hired and family) labor usage on the plot, in person-days per hectare.11 Table
1 provides summary statistics on all the aforementioned variables.
Estimation results are presented in Table 2. The standard test for separa-
tion is presented in column 1, and yields an unambiguous rejection of the null-
hypothesis of complete markets in that log household size is highly signi￿cant
at the usual levels of con￿dence (t-statistic = 4:55). In column 2, we control for
time-invariant household characteristics (￿h) using the ￿within￿transformation:
recall that the impact of household size can be identi￿ed here because we have
two years of data and household size varies over the two surveys.12 Again the
null of complete markets is strongly rejected by the data (t-statistic = 2:56).13
In column 3, we present results which allow for random household-time (￿ht)
e⁄ects: this speci￿cation, which also rejects the null of complete markets, can
however be dismissed on the basis of the corresponding Hausman test in favor of
￿xed e⁄ects, as mentioned above (p-value of the Hausman test is below 0:001).
Of course, household-time (￿ht) ￿xed e⁄ects would not allow one to test for
separation at all in that they would also sweep out the impact of household
size.
In column 4, we present results corresponding to the e¢ cient HT estimator
using the instrument set given in equation (4).14 The results are striking.
In contrast to what was found in columns 1 through 3, the null of complete
markets is not rejected at the usual levels of con￿dence: the point estimate of the
parameter associated with household size is statistically indistinguishable from
10An additional, empirical, motivation for using the ratios of cost-shares to the output
share is that the data in question come from a single village and that the only source of
cross-sectional variation in e⁄ective input prices stems from heterogeneity in contractual form
on plots under tenancy contracts.
11Note that there are no Z1ht variables in this speci￿cation.
12Note, despite a substantial fall in the variance of log household size, which goes from 0:328
in levels, to 0:014 when expressed in terms of deviations with respect to household-speci￿c
means (over both periods), that the estimated standard error is still reasonably small, with
the associated t-statistic being equal to 2:406. The time-invariant household ￿xed e⁄ects (￿h)
used here correspond to the type of speci￿cation used by Udry (1996), Table 3, column 2, for
a labor demand per hectare equation estimated on the Burkina Faso ICRISAT dataset.
13A household-speci￿c random e⁄ects speci￿cation (￿h, not presented) is strongly rejected
by the corresponding Hausman test.
14We made the assumption that the covariance matrix of the disturbance term has a
household-clustering form. That covariance matrix of error term has the advantage to be
￿exible by allowing arbitrary intra-cluster correlation and clustering heteroskedasticity. We
thus relaxe the more formal assumption assuming that the correlation within each cluster is
constant and has a nested random form. Obviously, our assumption has a cost in terms of
e¢ ciency.
6zero (t-statistic = 0:71).15 Moreover, the test of the overidentifying restrictions
does not lead one to reject, with a p-value equal to 0:545. In addition, the
Shea￿ s partial R2 ( 0:071 for the reduced form concerning the household size)
and the partial F-test (p-value below 0:001) of the joint signi￿cance of the
instruments point out that we are not facing a weak instrument problem.16
We also compute the test (developped by Bowden Turkington (1994)) based on
canonical correlation. 17 We reject that the smallest canonical correlation is
nul (p-value equal to 0:002).
However, the Hansen test is potentially inconclusive insofar as this test is
based on the strong assumption that at least as many instruments as the num-
ber of elements of Z2ht are exogenous. As the Hausman-Taylor procedure is
very sensitive to the choice of the variables included in X1iht and X2iht, we
compute the "di⁄erence Hansen" statistic which enables us to test the validity
of a subsets of instruments (see Hayashi, 2000). To that end, we ￿rst implement
the HT estimator using, in addition to the traditional matrix of instrument
(4), the instrument set e X1iht. Second, we test that the subset of instruments
PvtX1iht satis￿es the orthogonality conditions. The "di⁄erence Hansen" sta-
tistic presented in Table 2 does not lead one to reject the null hypothesis that
the speci￿ed variables are admissible instruments (p-value of 0:676).18
The upshot is that, in stark contrast to the usual approach which does not
control for unobservable individual e⁄ects, HT estimation leads to the non-
rejection of the null-hypothesis of complete markets. Moreover the consistency
of the HT-based results presented in column 4 is ensured, in that they are not
rejected by the tests of the corresponding overidentifying restrictions and the
di⁄erence Hansen test.
3 Concluding Remarks
This paper has shown that the rejection of the null-hypothesis of complete
markets in household models, based on the widely-used test of the exclusion
restrictions implied by separation, can be entirely due to the bias stemming
from uncontrolled-for unobservable individual heterogeneity.19 Our results are
particularly important for plot-level panel datasets where no time dimension is
15Note that all other point estimates presented in column 4 are fairly close to those obtained
using household-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects in column 2, except for that associated with the irrigated
plot dummy and the seeds cost share.
16The Shea￿ s partial R2 takes the intercorrelations among the instruments into account.
17Hall et al. (1996) shows that IV estimators are not weakly identi￿ed if and only if all the
canonical correlations converge to non-zero limits. They develop a likelihood ratio statistic
for a null that the smallest canonical correlation is zero.
18Obviously, testing our subset of overidentifying restrictions is only valid if e X1iht variables
are uncorrelated with time individuals e⁄ects. However, as explained above, this assumption
seems to be justi￿ed in a theoretically point of view.
19For a very recent example of the application of the standard approach, see Bowlus and
Sicular (2003).
7present, since there is no means at all, apart from the HT estimator, of testing
for separation while controlling for unobservable individual e⁄ects (i) if the latter
are correlated with the household-level variable that is the focus of the test, and
(ii) if no exogenous instruments are available. As was the case with the dataset
considered in our empirical illustration, both of these conditions are likely to
hold in practice.
The implications of our results are, moreover, suggestive, in that there may
be other received results in applied microeconomics, based on panel data, to
which the HT estimator could be fruitfully applied. An obvious example is
constituted by tests of the precautionary savings motive, in which empirical
measures of the risks faced by households are usually time invariant, and in
which no attempt is made to correct for unobservable individual e⁄ects.
Our results bring the methodology of testing for separation using panel data
into sharper focus. This is because we do not reject the null hypothesis of com-
plete markets, conditional on ￿ht. If one estimates a labor demand function on
US individual ￿rm data, as in Griliches and Hausman (1986), one ￿nds corre-
lated individual ￿rms e⁄ects, as we have found here for households. Thus, by
analogy, pro￿t-maximizing behavior by ￿rms is not incompatible with correlated
individual e⁄ects. However, in our dataset, since labor demand is a function
￿ht, it is not independent of household characteristics per se, although they are
unobservable characteristics. Another way of putting this is that, in most panel
datasets, testing for separation will undoubtedly uncover correlated individual
e⁄ects. If separation is taken in its strictest sense to mean that factor demands
should be independent of household characteristics, unconditional on ￿ht, then
we do in fact reject the null-hypothesis of complete markets. Any structural
interpretation, in terms of which market failures are binding, of the pattern of
violations of separation based on observable household characteristics (and thus
on those elements of ￿ which are statistically di⁄erent from zero) will probably,
however, be biased unless unobservable individual e⁄ects are controlled for using
the Hausman-Taylor estimator.
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Note on estimations
Many households did not engage in crop production in the second survey
(1995) because of adverse climatic shocks; this explains why the number of
household-years (ht) is much smaller than twice the number of households (h).
Intercept, year dummy, and eight crop dummies are included in all speci￿cations
presented in Table 2 (no constant in col. (2)); random e⁄ects are rejected in
9Mean Median Std. dev.
Person-day labor input per hectare (Yiht) 190:860 119:0 253:271
Plot characteristics (X1iht)
Soil type 1 (clay) 0:190 0:0 0:393
Soil type 2 (red) 0:201 0:0 0:401
Soil type 3 (sandy) 0:446 0:0 0:497
Soil type 4 (barren) 0:058 0:0 0:235
Irrigated plot 0:882 1:0 0:322
Contractual terms (X2iht)
% of costs paid by the cultivator
% of output accruing to the cultivator for:
Manure 1:008 1:0 0:121
Chemical fertilizer 1:016 1:0 0:145
Irrigation 0:999 1:0 0:150
Plowing 0:984 1:0 0:250
Family labor 1:063 1:0 0:243
Hired labor 1:041 1:0 0:230
Seeds 1:008 1:0 0:094
Transportation 1:006 1:0 0:171
Surface of plot in hectares 5:615 1:5 13:535
Household size (Z2ht) 8:257 7:0 5:117
Table 1: Summary statistics, ElOulja, Tunisia (447 plots (i), 150 households
(h), 196 household-years (ht))
favor of ￿xed e⁄ects in columns (2) and (3) by Hausman tests with associated
p-values of less than 0:0001. The dependent variable in the estimation results
presented in Table 2 is given by log person-days per hectare used on the plot;
t-statistics in parentheses below coe¢ cients, unless otherwise noted.
10Mean of dep. var. = 3:825 Pooling Fixed Random HT
e⁄ects e⁄ects (e¢ cient)
￿h ￿ht ￿ht
(1) (2) (3) (5)
Plot characteristics (X1iht)
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R2 0:6934 0:6558 0:6856 0:6677
Test of overid. restrictions [d.f., p-value] n:a: n:a: n:a: 10:805
[12;0:545]
Shea Partial R2 for log household size n:a: n:a: n:a: 0:071
Canonical correlation n:a: n:a: n:a: 0:053
[0:002]
Di⁄erence Hansen n:a: n:a: n:a: 10:214
[13;0:676]
Table 2: Labor demand equations: Pooling, ￿xed e⁄ects, random e⁄ects, and
Hausman-Taylor estimators (447 plots (i), 150 households (h), 196 household-
years (ht))
11